


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

ENEMY SUPPLY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA THROUGH 21 JUNE

ARMY review(s) completed.

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June 1970

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
June 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia Through 21 June

Introduction

This memorandum is the fifth in a series of weekly updates of an Intelligence Memorandum on enemy supply losses in Cambodia.\* The analysis is based on field reporting of the first 53 days of Allied ground actions in Cambodia. The assessment of supply losses remains tentative until the completion of current operations and the receipt of adjusted data from the field.

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*Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.*

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Supply Losses

1. Enemy losses of food, weapons and equipment, and ammunition in Cambodia from 30 April through 21 June are shown in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons</u>
Class I (food)	6,842
Classes II and IV (weapons and equipment)	317 <u>a/</u>
Class V (ammunition)	2,142
<i>Total</i>	<i>9,301</i>

*a. Including 159 tons of clothing, medical supplies, communications and personal equipment, and explosives other than ammunition (revised downward from 164 tons last week). Excluding an estimate of 1,292 tons of vehicles and 19 tons of petroleum. These categories were not included in our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia and have been excluded in this analysis in order to provide comparability of the data in making judgements on the drawdown of stockpiles.*

The losses include 20,400 individual weapons, 2,400 crew-served weapons, 9.4 million rifle rounds, about 4 million machinegun rounds, about 65,000 mortar rounds, and about 2,100 large rocket rounds. In addition, 416 vehicles have been captured.

2. The CIA estimate of 2,142 tons of ammunition losses is calculated on the basis of an average weight for broad categories of supplies. MACV reports ammunition losses through 21 June at a level of 1,645 tons, their estimate apparently being based on more detailed data than that available in Washington on a day-to-day basis. The expected receipt from the field of more detailed information concerning ammunition types and individual weights will permit a re-calculation of

enemy ammunition losses and may eliminate most of the differences between the CIA and MACV estimates.

### Trends in Supply Losses

3. During the week ending 21 June, 468 tons of supplies (388 tons of food, 14 tons of weapons, and 66 tons of ammunition) were uncovered by Allied operations, approximately 5% of the total uncovered since operations began on 30 April. The daily rate of supply seizures continues to decline as shown in the tabulation below:

	<u>Short Tons per Day</u>		
	<u>30 Apr-24 May</u>	<u>25 May-14 Jun</u>	<u>15 Jun-21 Jun</u>
Food	181	92	56
Weapons	4	2	2
Ammunition	51	38	9
<i>Total</i>	<i>236</i>	<i>132</i>	<i>67</i>

4. Losses in Base Areas 351 and 704 accounted for 76% of the food losses sustained by the enemy last week, as well as 95% of his weapons losses. Losses in the Fishhook (Base Area 352) and in Base Area 351 comprised 95% of the enemy's ammunition losses. Seventeen of 20 captured vehicles were found in Base Area 351.

5. Enemy losses in Cambodia compared with our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia are given in the tabulation below.

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>		<u>Losses as a Percent of Estimated Enemy Stockpiles</u>
	<u>Estimated Enemy Stockpiles in Cambodia Apr 1970</u>	<u>Enemy Losses in Cambodia 30 Apr-21 Jun</u>	
Food	10,370	6,842	66
Weapons and equipment	1,600-2,700	317	12-20
Ammunition	2,255	2,142	95

6. The data continue to suggest that weapons losses have not been as severe as ammunition losses. Weapons losses in Cambodia have been equal to 35% of comparable losses in South Vietnam last year. In addition, an analysis of identified enemy individual weapons lost by type shows that 22% were AK 47 assault rifles, 13% were CKC rifles, 36% were K 44 rifles, and the remaining 29% were a mixture of older Communist and Free World arms of various types. The K 44 rifle is an older rifle and was phased out of Communist Main Force units by mid-1969. Thus, of the identified small arms captured in Cambodia, only 35% are relatively new and are of the types preferred by enemy forces.

7. Ammunition losses in South Vietnam by type for 1969 are compared with the losses to date in Cambodia in the following tabulation:

	South Vietnam (1969)	Cambodia	Cambodia/ South Vietnam (Percent)
Small arms	12,403,000	9,351,204	75
Large rockets	4,000	2,106	53
Small rockets	70,000	40,267	58
Mortars	190,000	64,590	34
Grenades	149,000	53,364	36
Recoilless rifles	17,300	27,721	160

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Resupply Problems

9. An interrogation on 2 June at Mimot, Cambodia, revealed that a 200-man element of Rear Service Group 82 (formerly located near Base Area 353) moved every few days to avoid detection by Allied operations. The element reportedly carried all rice stocks as it moved, and enough rice was on hand to feed the units this element supports for 3 months.

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Summary

14. US and South Vietnamese forces have captured about 9,300 tons of supplies during the first 53 days of operations in Cambodia. About 74% of enemy losses consist of food, about 23% ammunition, and the remainder weapons and equipment. The rate of supply captures continued to decline last week.

15. Food losses are currently about 66% of the estimated stockpiles in Cambodia at the start of Allied operations, while ammunition losses are about 95% of originally estimated stocks. It is probable that more ammunition was stocked in Cambodia prior to Allied operations than our original estimates would indicate.

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17. In the Laotian Panhandle, while the Communists continued to move supplies, heavy monsoon rains and air strikes probably restricted logistic activity to its lowest level since the beginning of the Cambodian operation.

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Cumulative Results of US and ARVN Operations in Cambodia  
(as of 21 June 2000 Hours EDT)


Supply Item	Parrot's Beak	Fishhook	Base Areas					Terminated Operations <sup>a/</sup>	Total
			740	351	350	704/709	704		
Individual weapons	1,852	4,682	587	2,792	319	2,719	4,066	3,395	20,412 <sup>b/</sup>
Crew-served weapons	470	728	133	407	31	157	71	441	2,438 <sup>b/</sup>
Rice (tons)	876	2,982	411	1,505	76	41	25	926	6,842
Vehicles	25	237	22	116	2	8	0	6	416
Ammunition (tons)	486	392	20	1,024	25	27	24 <sup>c/</sup>	144	2,142

a. Terminated operations include Rock Crusher IV, Tia Chop (Base Area 354), Binh Tay I (Base Area 702), Binh Tay II (Base Area 701), and Cuu Long II (Base Area 704).

b. Represents the loss of about 158 tons of arms.

c. Revised downward from the 25 tons reported last week.

VC/NVA Base Areas Along Cambodian Border



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ROOM NO. <b>4F41</b>	BUILDING <b>Hdgrs.</b>	

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